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Abstract
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical
question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this
task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,
have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations
is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with
such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known.
In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be
extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher mar-
kets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings
where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the
allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard
to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable
uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can
be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very
mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those
which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.
1 Introduction
A key problem in market design is ‘who gets what’ (Roth, 2015). An important mechanism for
the allocation of scarce items to multiple individuals is the use of market equilibrium. In these
mechanisms individuals have preferences over scarce items and budgets of money. Prices are set for
items such that demand of individuals equals the supply of items. A major issue in practice with
such mechanisms is that the utility of an individual is often not known exactly (sometimes even to
the individuals themselves). In this paper, we take up the question of computing a robust market
equilibrium which takes this imperfect information into account.
Market equilibrium-based allocations are increasingly prevalent in real world mechanisms and ro-
bustness is an important issue in many of these applications.
In the allocation of courses to students at business schools students report preferences over courses,
are given a budget of ‘fake’ currency, and are allocated the courses they receive in the market equi-
librium which matches supply of courses to demand (Budish and Cantillon, 2012). Here students
may not be fully aware of their own exact valuations for courses.
In online advertising advertisers report valuations for various impressions, enter budgets, and an
auction mechanism again sets supply equal to demand - finding an equilibrium of the market Bal-
seiro, Besbes, and Weintraub (2015); Balseiro et al. (2017); Balseiro and Gur (2017). In practice
advertisers’ bids in the auction (which are equivalent to a paced version of their valuation in equilib-
rium (Borgs et al., 2007; Conitzer et al., 2018, 2019)) come from a combination of a per-interaction
valuation and a machine learning model which predicts the probability that a given user will interact
with that ad. For example, an advertiser might say they are willing to pay $1 per click and a model
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could predict that a user will click a particular ad with probability .1– this would lead to a bid of 10
cents on the ad when combined with the valuations. Here, again, the valuation is imperfectly known
as both the advertiser’s willingness to pay and, more so, the click prediction model, come with noise.
We begin with the simplest workhorse model in this literature: linear Fisher markets. In such markets
there are buyers and items. Buyers have finite budgets. Items are scarce and divisible. Buyers have
utility for each item and value a bundle as the utility-weighted sum of the items in the bundle. We
consider both standard Fisher markets where buyer budgets do not have any use outside the market,
and quasi-Fisher markets where leftover money has a fixed value for each buyer. Equilibria in such
markets include allocations to individuals and prices for items, so that buyer demands sum up to
supply and allocations satisfy buyer demands.
In this article, we show how to extend market equilibrium to the notion of robust market equilibrium
(RME). Here buyers do not have point-valued utilities for each item, but rather have ‘uncertainty
sets’ of possible valuations. In this case a buyer wants to purchase bundles that optimize their worst
case utility given prices. This can reflect risk aversion on the part of the buyers (buyers are actually
not perfectly aware of item utility) or ignorance on the part of the market designer if the market
equilibrium is simply used as an allocative mechanism (e.g. CEEI). RME can be partly be viewed
as a model of classical equilibrium with a particular class of nonlinear utility functions. Indeed, the
existence of an RME is no different than the existence of a classical equilibrium with appropriate
utilities; the main point of departure is how the resulting equilibria are measured. We extend classical
notions of envy and regret to reflect uncertainty in buyer valuations, and we give bounds on these
quantities as functions of the size of the uncertainty sets.
It is well-known that computing market equilibria can be computationally intractable for certain
market models. One of the earliest positive results in this area is the celebrated Eisenberg-Gale con-
vex program for Fisher markets (Eisenberg and Gale, 1959); this convex program was first proposed
for linear utility functions, but was later shown to work for any utilities which are homogeneous of
degree one Eisenberg (1961). In the past 20 years, this convex programming approach has been
extended to handle more general Fisher markets such as spending constraint utilities (Birnbaum,
Devanur, and Xiao, 2011), utility-capped buyers, quasi-linear buyers (Chen, Ye, and Zhang, 2007;
Cole et al., 2017), and Fisher markets with transaction costs (Chakraborty, Devanur, and Karande,
2010).
Over the course of this article, we show how techniques from the robust optimization literature can
be combined with the Eisenberg-Gale convex program to compute RME in both Fisher and quasi-
Fisher markets. In principle, this means the existence of polynomial-time algorithms for computing
Fisher or quasi-Fisher RME reduces to the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm for evaluating
robust utilities. In practice, we need to represent the value of a robust utility as a tractable conic
optimization problem. We propose two types of uncertainty sets that lead to convex programs which
can be efficiently solved using modern solvers, and we apply these proposals to study RME in real
datasets.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study robust market equilibria. However, the topic
of robust variants of optimization problems has been studied extensively (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski,
2002; Bertsimas and Sim, 2004; Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui, and Nemirovski, 2009; Bertsimas, Brown, and
Caramanis, 2011). There, some nominal mathematical program is given, and then the robust variant
of the program requires that the constraints hold for every instantiation of parameters from some
uncertainty set. Our robust market equilibrium approach can be viewed as the natural uncertainty
parameterization of Eisenberg-Gale style convex programs. A similar uncertainty-parametrization
of utilities was considered by Aghassi and Bertsimas (2006) in the context of game-theoretic equi-
librium where they provide a robust analogue of Bayesian equilibrium. Robust game-theoretic equi-
libria have also been considered in the context of counterfactual prediction (Peysakhovich, Kroer,
and Lerer, 2019). Finally, there is literature on robust mechanism design (Bergemann and Morris,
2005; Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon, 2018; Albert et al., 2017), where the goal is to design mech-
anisms that are robust either to uncertainty about the distribution over agent payoffs, or the belief
that an agent holds about the types of other agents. Due to the close relationship between mechanism
design and market equilibria it would be interesting to understand what kind of robustness properties
RME has with respect to traditional robust mechanism design objectives.
2
2 Fisher Markets
Consider a market where n buyers compete for m divisible goods, each of unit supply. Each buyer
brings a budget bi of currency to this market, and a utility function ui over allocations of the m
goods. The problem of market equilibria is to determine prices for goods and allocations of goods
to buyers which satisfy both supply constraints, and certain optimality conditions for each buyer.
The supply constraints do not depend on further details of the market. If X is a nonnegative matrix
where xij is the allocation of good j to buyer i, the allocation is feasible if
∑n
i=1 xij ≤ 1 for all
goods j.
The precise form of the buyer optimality conditions depends on whether or not money has value
outside the market. Suppose that the market has assigned each good j a price pj , and assemble
these prices into a vector p in Rm+ . When money has no intrinsic value, we are in a Fisher market.
A market equilibrium is a feasible allocation X and a set of prices p such that each buyer prefers
what they are allocated over anything else they could afford:
xi ∈ argmax{ui(z) | z ∈ Rm+ and p∗ · z ≤ bi}. (1)
When money has intrinsic value, buyer utilities become (z, s) 7→ ui(z) + s, where s is the buyer’s
retained budget. Here the buyer optimality conditions for market equilibria are that
(xi, ri) ∈ argmax{ui(z) + s | z ∈ Rm+ , s ∈ R+, (2)
and p · z + s ≤ bi}
for the specific value ri = bi − p · xi. Throughout this article we call this model a quasi-Fisher
market, because the effective utility functions (z, s) 7→ ui(z)+s are broadly known as quasilinear
utilities in the economics literature.
Linear utility functions offer the simplest model for buyer preferences in market equilibrium prob-
lems. In a linear model, each buyer possesses a valuation vector vi ∈ Rm+ , and assigns utility
ui(z) = vi · z to a bundle of goods z. There is one serious drawback to using linear utilities:
in large markets, it is not realistic to assume that all vi’s are known exactly– either by buyers, or by
a market maker.
We thus propose a model where each buyer has an associated uncertainty set of valuations Vi ⊂
Rm+ ; an uncertainty set gives rise to a robust utility
ui(z) = min{z · v | v ∈ Vi}. (3)
It is easy to see that for all nonempty Vi, these robust utilities are concave, and positively homoge-
neous of degree 1. We assume these uncertainty sets are nonempty, compact, and satisfy ui(1) > 0.
With regards to Vi being nonempty, we will often find it useful to suppose that each buyer has a
distinguished nominal valuation vˆi ∈ Vi. We often call the function z 7→ vˆi ·z the nominal utility
of buyer i.
2.1 Computing market equilibria
In a foundational result, Eisenberg and Gale (1959) showed that equilibria for Fisher markets with
linear utility functions can be computed by solving a particular centralized convex program. In a
follow-up work Eisenberg (1961) showed the same convex program can be used to compute Fisher-
market equilibria whenever utilities are concave, and homogeneous of degree one. Much later, Chen,
Ye, and Zhang (2007) gave a simpler proof for Eisenberg’s 1961 result, which extended naturally to
compute equilibria in quasi-Fisher markets.1
Chen et al.’s result for quasi-Fisher markets requires a very minor modification to the convex pro-
gram originally proposed by Eisenberg and Gale. We can state both convex programs by considering
a parametric optimization problem: let Q ∈ {0, 1} be a parameter, where Q = 1 indicates a quasi-
Fisher market model, and Q = 0 indicates a Fisher market model. The Eisenberg-Gale convex
1In situ, Chen et al. refer to quasi-Fisher markets as mixed Fisher Arrow-Debreu markets.
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program is
max
∑n
i=1 bi log(ti)−Q ri (4)
s.t. (xi, ti, ri) ∈ Rm+2+ ∀ i ∈ [n],
ti ≤ ui(xi) + Q ri ∀ i ∈ [n],∑n
i=1 xij ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ [m].
The results of Eisenberg and Chen et al. ensure that as long as ui are concave and homogeneous of
degree one, then for p ∈ Rm+ as the vector of dual variables to the capacity constraints, the matrix
X whose rows are xi forms an equilibrium allocation with respect to prices p.
Because we defined our robust utilities as the minimum over a set of linear functions, we get that
robust utilities are homogeneous with degree 1 and concave. This establishes the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 1. A solution to (4) with Q = 0 produces an equilibrium for the Fisher market where
ui are given by (3). Optimal prices p and allocationsX satisfy the following properties:
1. Each xi is in the demand set of buyer i, i.e. (1) holds.
2. Every item j with pj > 0 clears the market:
∑
i xij = 1.
3. For every buyer i, there exists a v∗i ∈ argminv∈Vi v ·xi for which allocated items have the
same bang per buck:
if xij , xik > 0 then v∗ij/pj = v
∗
ik/pk.
The first property in Proposition 1 is about individual optimality; every buyer seeking to optimize
her own utility in the robust sense will find the allocations in her demand set. The second property
shows market clearing. The third property shows that the worst case utilities are in fact attained in
the allocation, and that an “equal rates” condition holds at one of these worst-case utility vectors.
Proposition 2. A solution to (4) with Q = 1 produces an equilibrium for the quasi-Fisher market
with ui given by (3). Analogous conditions to those in Proposition 1 hold for prices p and allocations
X . Furthermore, if β denotes optimal dual variables to the utility hypograph constraints, then for
all buyers i
1. βi ≤ 1, and βi = 1 whenever p · xi < bi.
2. There is a v∗i ∈ argminv∈Vi v ·xi so that βi ≤ pj/v∗ij for all j, and βi = pj/v∗ij whenever
xij > 0.
The additional conditions concern interpretation of the dual variables βi as pacing multipliers in a
first-price auction (Conitzer et al., 2019). The allocation mechanism may be viewed as a first price
auction where buyer i competes for item j with a modified or “paced” bid of βivij . The pacing
multipliers are no greater than one (ensuring that no buyer buys a good when its price exceeds its
value), there is no unnecessary pacing, and the robust bang-per-buck is equal for all allocated items
to buyer i.
Propositions 1 and 2 argue that a solution to (4) leads to a reasonable solution concept: for risk averse
agents that are seeking to robustly maximize their utilities in the face of the market uncertainty, it
produces allocations in their individual demand sets. Moreover, it also leads to market clearing,
which is desirable for the market designer. Finally, the solution is intuitive, and in fact corresponds
to a “standard” market equilibrium with respect to a set of attained (worst case) realizations of the
utilities.
From a theoretical perspective, computing market equilibria with robust utilities is no harder than
solving an appropriate convex program. Unfortunately, not all convex programs are tractable; the
potential stumbling block in our case is the need to represent the robust utilities via hypographs
Hi
.
= {(t, z) | t ≤ ui(z)}
using a limited library of convex constraints on t and z. When the uncertainty sets Vi have an
explicit convex description, the Hi can be represented by appealing to convex duality. For example,
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if Vi = {v | ‖v − vˆi‖ ≤ } for the nominal valuation vˆi and some reference norm ‖ · ‖, the
hypograph can be represented as
Hi = {(t, z) | t+ ‖z‖∗ ≤ vˆi · z}
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm to ‖ · ‖. In cases such as this, we can appeal to standard convex
programming solvers, which allow only specific convex operations.
In principle, the Vi need not be convex. This is for the following reason: if “conv” is the operator
that computes a set’s convex hull, then
min{z · v | v ∈ Vi} = min{z · v | v ∈ convVi}
for all z in Rm. Thus we may replace nonconvex uncertainty sets by their convex hulls without loss
of generality. The challenge of nonconvex uncertainty sets then reduces to the problem of efficiently
representing their convex hulls.
2.2 A dual formulation
The literature on theoretical analysis of market equilibrium often benefits from analyzing primal
and dual formulations in conjunction with one another. Given the nature of our utility functions, it
is reasonably straightforward to compute the dual by appealing to Fenchel duality. The drawback
to working with a Fenchel dual is that it can become harder to interpret dual variables. To assist
others in future theoretical analysis of market equilibria with robust utility functions, we provide the
following result (the proof of which is in Appendix B, along with all other omitted proofs of claims
in this article):
Proposition 3. Let ui by given by (3) where Vi ⊂ Rm+ are nonempty compact convex sets, and
ui(1) > 0. It can be shown that the following problem is a dual to (4)
min p · 1−
n∑
i=1
{bi + bi log(βi/bi)} (5)
s.t. p ∈ Rm+ , β ∈ Rn+
Q[1− β] ≥ 0
p ≥ βivi ∀ i ∈ [n]
vi ∈ Vi ∀ i ∈ [n].
The formulation is nonconvex as stated, due to bilinear inequality constraints p ≥ βivi in the vari-
ables βi and vi. This bilinearity can be represented in a convex way by using perspective functions.
For each i ∈ [n], setWi = Rm+ + Vi.2 TheWi are convex sets, and so their indicator functions
δWi(y) =
{
0 if y ∈ Wi
+∞ otherwise
are also convex. The bilinear constraints can thus be written
βiδWi(p/βi) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ [n].
These constraints are convex, since the mappings on the left-hand-side of the inequalities are the per-
spectives of the convex functions δWi . It can be shown that this formulation (in terms of perspectives-
of-indicators) is in fact precisely what results when applying Fenchel duality to (4) directly.
3 Properties of Robust Equilibria
On the surface, the market equilibria considered in this article are no different than classical market
equilibria with a particular choice of nonlinear utility function. Thus there are standard properties
of market equilibria which are naturally satisfied in our setting. For example, if (X,p) form an
equilibrium in a Fisher market, and all budgets bi = 1, then the allocations are envy-free in the sense
that for all buyers i
ui(xi) ≥ ui(xi′) for all i′ in [n].
2Addition here denotes the Minkowski sum.
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Similarly, the allocations have no regret, in that for all i
Ri(y,p)
.
= max{ui(z)− ui(y) | z ∈ Rm+ , p · z ≤ bi}
satisfies Ri(xi,p) = 0. These classical measures of fairness are important, but they do not reflect
our reason for choosing the robust utilities ui(z) = min{z · v | v ∈ Vi} in the first place.
We assume that once a buyer has received a bundle of goods xi, some vi ∈ Vi instantiates as the
buyer’s true valuation. This can occur, for example, if uncertainty came from the fact that buyers
did not have perfect clarity into what they valued during evaluation time but gain this information
when they actually receive the good. In this model it is natural to evaluate metrics such as envy,
regret, or Nash Social Welfare with respect to these realizations of buyer uncertainty. We focus on
the scenarios when the valuation realizes to its nominal value, and when it realizes adversarially.
3.1 Adversarially-robust envy
LetX denote a matrix whose rows xi are equilibrium allocations with respect to prices p and robust
utilities ui.
Also let ri = bi−p ·xi denote the retained budget for each buyer i ∈ [n] (understanding that ri = 0
in Fisher markets). In these terms, robust envy is
Ei(X,p) = max (v · xi′ + ri′)− (v · xi + ri)
s.t v ∈ Vi, i′ ∈ [n].
In order to analyze robust envy, it is helpful to frame things in terms of the underlying robust utility
functions. One may verify that the following identity holds
Ei(X,p) = max
i′∈[n]
{ri′ − ri − ui(xi − xi′)}.
It is therefore evident that we can efficiently compute robust envy whenever we can compute the
utility functions ui.
3.2 Adversarially-robust regret
Given prices p, the ith buyer takes an action by drawing from the following polytope
Zi(p) = {z |0 ≤ z ≤ 1, p · z ≤ bi}.
Then given an allocation xi, we thus define a buyer’s robust regret as
Ri(xi,p) = max [v −Qp] · z − [v −Qp] · xi
s.t. v ∈ Vi, z ∈ Zi(p)
– where “Q” is 1 if the buyer is in a quasi-Fisher market, and 0 if otherwise. Mirroring our approach
to robust-envy, robust-regret can be expressed with the robust utility functions. Specifically,
Ri(xi,p) = max Qp · [xi − z]− ui(xi − z)
s.t. z ∈ Zi(p).
Robust regret is harder to compute than robust envy. The issue is that the objective appearing in
the second expression forRi(xi,p) is convex, rather than concave. From a complexity perspective,
it is very difficult to maximize convex functions. Our one reason for hope is that we are trying to
maximize a convex function over the polytope Zi(p). In this specific case we may use the fact that
the maximum of a real-valued convex function over a polytope is always attained at one of the
polytope’s extreme points. Thus in principle, it is possible to compute Ri(xi,p) by evaluating the
objective function at each extreme point of Zi(p), and taking the largest value. This approach may
be viable in Fisher markets for buyers that are heavily budget constrained, since if bi ≤ pj for all
goods j, then the extreme points of Zi(p) are z(0) = 0, and z(j) = bi/pjej for all j ∈ [m].3 In
other contexts the extreme-point approach will likely be impractical. For example, in Fisher markets
where prices are low compared to a buyer’s budget, the set Zi(p) can contain as many as 2m extreme
points.
3Here, ej denotes the j th standard basis vector in Rm.
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3.3 Bounds in Fisher markets
In this section we describe elementary ways to bound robust envy and robust regret for Fisher mar-
kets.
Lemma 1. Suppose the `1-width of Vi is bounded above by w. Then for all v in Vi and all z with
‖z‖∞ ≤ 1, we have
−w + v · z ≤ ui(z) ≤ v · z + w.
Proof. Fix v in Vi and z with ‖z‖∞ ≤ 1. Since Vi is compact, there exists a v? ∈ Vi so that
ui(z) = v
? · z. Since the `1-width of Vi is bounded by w, we have that ∆v = v? − v satisfies
‖∆v‖1 ≤ w. Writing ui(z) = v · z + ∆v · z, we can invoke duality between the `1 and `∞ norms
to see that |∆v · z| ≤ w. The result follows.
Lemma 1 is useful because the natural domain for ui in robust regret and envy is the unit `∞ ball.
Proposition 4. Suppose the `1-width of Vi is bounded above by w. Then robust regret is bounded
by 2w. If all budgets are equal then robust is envy is bounded by 2w.
Proof. Let X,p be a robust market equilibrium. Let i∗,v∗ be the maximizers of robust envy for
buyer i. We then have
Ei(X,p) = (v∗ · xi∗ + ri∗)− (v∗ · xi + ri)
≤ (w + ui(xi∗) + ri∗)− (−w + ui(xi) + ri)
= 2w + (ui(xi∗) + ri∗)− (ui(xi) + ri))
≤ 2w,
where the first inequality follows by Lemma 1 (since supplies are 1), and the second inequality
follows by the no-envy property since X,p constitute a market equilibrium with respect to the
robust utilities and budgets are equal.
The proof for robust regret is analogous, but using the fact that ui(xi)−Qp ·xi ≥ ui(z)−Qp · z
where z is the allocation for robust regret.
While the above bounds hold uniformly for every agent i, in the specific case when the `∞-width
of the uncertainty sets are small one can also obtain a bound on the average robust regret of all the
buyers.
Proposition 5. Suppose that for each buyer i ∈ [n], we have |vij − v′ij | ≤ R for all j ∈ [m] and all
vi,v
′
i ∈ Vi. Then the following holds:
1
n
n∑
i=1
Robust-Regreti ≤
2Rm
n
.
In a scarce market where the number of buyers far exceeds the number of items, the bound in
Proposition 5 guarantees that the average regret is small.
4 Concrete Models for Buyer Uncertainty
We consider the case of low rank markets (Kroer et al., 2019; Peysakhovich and Kroer, 2019). In
these markets, the valuations individuals place on items are not independent, and can be predicted
from one another; this is common in most real-world allocation problems (e.g. valuations for courses
are correlated within person, ratings of movies are correlated within person, willingness to pay for
different impressions are correlated within advertiser).
Let V̂ denote our estimated valuation matrix for the Fischer market, i.e. vˆij is the value that individ-
ual i places on item j. The low rank model assumes that V̂ = Θ̂Φ̂ᵀ where Θ̂ and Φ̂ are embedding
matrices for individuals and items respectively, of sizes n× d and m× d. The problem is typically
interesting in the regime where where d << n,m.
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In such a model, there are a few natural sources of uncertainty. For example, in practice, individual
and item embeddings would typically be estimated using some matrix completion procedure. The
matrix completion procedure may introduce errors (relative to the ground-truth completed matrix),
and these errors induce uncertainty on factors Θ̂ or Φ̂. There is also the possibility that the low-rank
assumption does not well reflect reality; this would correspond to uncertainty in small-norm but
high-rank perturbations to V̂ .
When the embedding model is imperfect and subject to uncertainty, a natural description one may
consider is the joint uncertainty model defined by the set VJi (1, 2) as:
{θΦᵀ | θ ∈ R1×d, θΦᵀ ≥ 0, ‖θ − θˆi‖p ≤ 1‖θˆi‖p,
‖Φ− Φ̂‖q ≤ 2‖Φ̂‖q, θΦᵀ · 1 = θˆiΦ̂ᵀ · 1}.
This model captures uncertainty in both the buyer-side and item-side embedding representations.
The model parameters include a pair of norms (the p-norm for the vector quantity, and the q-norm
for the matrix quantity),4 as well as relative radii 1, 2 ∈ (0, 1).
Certain special cases of the joint uncertainty model are interesting to consider. The direct model for
uncertainty under such parameters is realized when 2 = 0, and Φ̂ = I , the identity matrix. In this
situation, we have:
Vdi (p, ) = {v |v ∈ Rm, v ≥ 0,
‖v − vˆi‖p ≤ ‖vˆi‖p
v · 1 = vˆi · 1}.
When 2 = 0 but Φ̂ is arbitrary, we obtain the buyerside model, which is described by:
Vbi (p, ) = {θΦ̂ᵀ |θ ∈ R1×d, θΦ̂ᵀ ≥ 0,
‖θ − θˆi‖p ≤ ‖θˆi‖p,
θΦ̂ᵀ · 1 = θˆiΦ̂ᵀ · 1}.
The linear equality constraints in these definitions require that we conserve utility about the vector
of all ones (“1”); there are several compelling reasons for doing this. First, it enforces a kind of
regularity condition: assuming vˆi is nonzero, the robust utilities will be positive under the uniform
allocation xi = 1/m, regardless of  ≥ 0 and p ≥ 1. Positivity of robust utilities under the uni-
form allocation ensures that the convex program (4) will always be feasible. The second reason for
conserving utility about 1 is a concentration argument: although it is unrealistic to presume that all
entries vˆij are known to high precision, mild statistical assumptions allow us to reliably estimate
the sum
∑m
j=1 vˆij = vˆi · 1. Finally, because all vi in the uncertainty sets are elementwise nonnega-
tive, the conservation constraint provides a scale-invariance: ‖vi‖1 = ‖vˆi‖1. This prevents us from
thinking that some vi in Vi are more likely than others, simply because they have smaller norm.
We now turn to a deriving a tractable representation for the hypographs of ui under the direct model.
Fix i ∈ [n], p ≥ 1, and  ∈ (0, 1). For λ in Rm+ and µ in R, consider the parameterized Lagrangian
L(v,λ, µ; z) = v · z + µ(v · 1− vˆi · 1)− v · λ
where v is restricted to Di
.
= {v | ‖v − vˆi‖p ≤ ‖vˆi‖p}. Note how the Lagrangian is convex
in v, concave in λ, µ, and how Di is a compact convex set. We can thus invoke strong duality in a
minimax representation for ui(z):
ui(z) = min
v∈Di
maxλ≥0
µ∈R
{L(v,λ, µ; z)}

= max
λ≥0
µ∈R
{
min
‖∆v‖p≤‖vˆi‖p
{L(vˆi + ∆v,λ, µ; z)}
}
= max
λ≥0
µ∈R
{
vˆi · [z − λ]− ‖vˆi‖p‖z − λ+ µ1‖∗p
}
4The “p” in “p-norm” should not be confused with vectors p of market prices for goods.
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– where ‖ · ‖∗p is dual to the p-norm. The third identity allows us to represent the hypograph of ui in
the direct uncertainty model as
Hi = {(z, t) | (z, t, µ, τ,λ) ∈ Rm+3 × Rm+
‖z − λ+ µ1‖∗p ≤ τ/(‖vˆi‖p)
t+ τ ≤ vˆi · [z − λ]}.
Now we address the buyerside uncertainty model. The derivation proceeds in an identical fashion,
by minimizing an appropriate Lagrangian over the compact convex set {θ | ‖θ − θˆi‖p ≤ ‖θˆi‖p}.
The outcome of this process is that ui(z) = min{z · v | v ∈ Vbi (p, )} has hypograph
Hi = {(z, t) | (z, t, µ, τ,λ) ∈ Rm+3 × Rm+
‖Φᵀ[z − λ+ µ1]‖∗p ≤ τ/(‖vˆi‖p)
t+ τ ≤ vˆi · [z − λ]}.
In the next section, we provide numerical experiments that investigate robust equilibria with respect
to direct and buyer-side models.
In contrast to the direct and the buyer-side uncertainty models which have tractable representations,
the convex hull of the fully general joint uncertainty model given by VJi (1, 2) does not seem to
be amenable to an exact, tractable representation. In the special case when p corresponds to the
Euclidean norm and q corresponds to the Frobenius norm, we provide a tractable representation of
an outer approximation of this set. Robust equilibria may be computed with respect to these outer
approximations; since
min
v∈Vouti (1,2)
v · z ≤ min
v∈VJi (1,2)
v · z ∀ z ∈ Rm,
the resulting allocations will be guaranteed to be robust against all uncertainty realizations in
VJi (1, 2).
Proposition 6. Let Vouti (1, 2) denote the set
{v :v = µ+ δΦ̂ᵀ + θˆi∆ᵀ + θˆiΦ̂ᵀ,
v ≥ 0, v · 1 = vˆi · 1, ‖δ‖2 ≤ 1‖θˆi‖2,
‖µ‖2 ≤ 12‖θˆi‖2‖Φ̂‖F , ‖∆‖F ≤ 2‖Φ̂‖F }.
Then
conv
(VJi (1, 2)) ⊆ Vouti (1, 2).
Note that Vouti (1, 2) is a convex body, and that it is tractable to optimize over since it only involves
second-order cone constraints.
5 Experimental Results
We construct low rank markets following Kroer et al. (2019). We start with the MovieLens 1M
dataset where ≈ 6000 individuals give ratings to ≈ 4000 movies. We use standard techniques to
complete the matrix and take the 200 individuals with the most movies rated; these individuals are
endowed with a unit budget of fictitious currency. From this we construct a “plentiful” market with
m = 500 goods (movies), and a “scarce” market with m = 50 goods. We consider these markets
in Fisher and quasi-Fisher settings, and with both direct and buyerside models from Section 4. For
the buyerside models, Φˆ are of size m× d, where d is the rank of the nominal valuation matrix; our
scarce and plentiful markets had ranks 25 and 35 respectively. Experiments here use the 2-norm;
refer to Appendix A for the same experiments under 1-norm uncertainty.
For our implementation we rely on CVXPY 1.0 (Diamond and Boyd, 2016; Agrawal et al., 2018) to
interface with solvers MOSEK (MOSEK ApS, 2019; Dahl and Andersen, 2019) and ECOS (Dom-
ahidi, Chu, and Boyd, 2013). MOSEK is used to solve the equilibrium problems; although other
solvers exist which support the logarithmic terms in the objective, it is our experience that no other
solver can reliably handle equilibrium problems beyond very small scales. EOCS is used to evaluate
utility functions as part of computing robust envy and robust-utility Nash welfare (the latter metric
we define momentarily).
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5.1 Nash welfare
Nash Social Welfare (the product of agent’s utility functions) is a popular measure of community
utility. Here we adopt a normalized version of Nash Social Welfare: the budget-weighted geometric
means of utility functions; we consider this quantity with respect to nominal utilities xi 7→ vˆi ·xi+ri
and robust utilities xi 7→ ui(xi) + ri. By evaluating the nominal-utility Nash welfare at the robust
solution, we get a sense of the “price of robustness.” By evaluating the robust-utility Nash welfare at
the nominal solution, we can measure the price of overconfidence in the point estimate {vˆi} ≈ Vi.
In every single experiment we conducted, the nominal Nash welfare of the robust solution decayed
slower than the robust Nash welfare of the nominal solution. This is to say: the potential price of
robustness was usually modest, relative to the potential price of optimism.
The robust Nash welfare of a nominal solution is very sensitive to direct uncertainty, while it is
relatively stable for buyerside uncertainty. This trend holds in Fisher and quasi-Fisher markets. In
quasi-Fisher models, the nominal Nash welfare of a robust solution can be larger than the nominal
Nash welfare of the nominal solution. This is surprising, since robust solutions are optimizing for a
different objective than nominal Nash welfare.
Qualitatively, this can be attributed to uncertainty causing some buyers to exit the market, which
drives down prices for those that remain in the market. We found that this mostly happens with the
buyerside uncertainty model in scarce markets. It is unclear why this happens more with buyerside
than direct uncertainty models, however it is very reasonable that this happens more with scarce
rather than plentiful markets.
5.2 Robust envy
In the last section we saw how the robust Nash welfare of a nominal solution is very sensitive
to direct uncertainty, and is relatively stable for buyerside uncertainty. These trends also hold for
robust envy.
10
The benefits of a robust solution persist in scarce markets, although the effects are less pronounced
here. Out of all experiments we conducted, the figure below illustrates the case where robust envy
distributions exhibited the most overlap. Even in this case, there is a clear performance benefit of
the robust solution, compared to the nominal solution.
5.3 Equilibrium prices in quasi-Fisher markets
The figure below plots equilibrium prices of every good j as the uncertainty radius  ranges from 0
to 0.5. These lines have reduced opacity, so that areas of higher price density can be easily discerned.
The minimum, maximum, and mean prices are traced by solid black lines.
There are several trends of note in this figure. First, we see that in the plentiful market, the average
price remains constant even as uncertainty increases. Thus in the plentiful setting, even very large
amounts of uncertainty may not dissuade buyers from participating in the market. In the scarce mar-
ket we see a different outcome: the average price drops slowly and steadily, from just below 4.0 to
just above 3.5. There are still important commonalities between the plentiful and scarce markets.
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The simplest properties are that prices pj do not evolve monotonically as  increases, and that un-
certainty can cause changes in the order of goods when sorting by pj . Another crucial property is
that as  gets particularly large, the prices converge to a common value. Such convergence agrees
with our intuition that for large enough , all buyers’ uncertainty sets will reduce to scaled standard
simplices Vdi (p, ) = {v | 0 ≤ v, v · 1 = vˆi · 1}.
As a final point, we consider how different pricing schemes affect the purchasing decisions of buyers
with robust utility functions. The following plot shows how adjusting prices to reflect uncertainty
(in red) results in much larger revenue than if prices were set as though there was no uncertainty (in
blue).
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Appendices
Appendix A: 1-norm experiments
Here we repeat the experiments from Section 5, this time using 1-norm uncertainty rather than 2-
norm uncertainty.
We begin with Nash welfare. In the 2-norm experiments we claimed that the robust Nash welfare of
a nominal solution is very sensitive to direct uncertainty, while it is relatively stable for buyerside
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uncertainty. This is even more true when working with uncertainty derived from the 1-norm. Con-
sider the left panel of the first figure below: a very small perturbation  = 0.01 saw the robust Nash
welfare of the nominal solution drop two orders of magnitude. By contrast, both nominal and robust
Nash welfare of the robust solution declined by only a few percentage points.
Next we consider robust envy. The following figure shows how the robust solution produces far better
outcomes than the nominal solution for the plentiful Fisher market under direct-model Vdi (1, 0.03)
uncertainty. This is not the case for buyerside uncertainty. Even with a large value of  = 0.2, the
robust-envy distributions induced by nominal and robust solutions differ primarily by a small shift
in mean.
The robust-envy benefits of using robust solutions persist in our scarce market, although the effects
are less dramatic here. In the following figure, note that the distributions of direct-model robust-envy
induced by robust and nominal solutions are disjoint, when they exhibited overlap in the 2-norm
setting.
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Now we turn to how uncertainty affects equilibrium prices. These experiments only consider quasi-
Fisher markets, since buyers in these settings have a choice of whether or not to participate in the
market.
The figure below should be read as follows: the price of every good j is plotted as the uncertainty
radius  ranges from 0 to 0.5. These lines have reduced opacity, so that areas of higher price density
can be easily discerned. The minimum, maximum, and mean prices are traced by solid black lines
in the upper, lower, and middle portions of the plots respectively.
There are important similarities between the plots above and the analogous plots in 2-norm ex-
periments. First, we note that prices do not evolve monotonically as  increases, and second, the
ordering on goods induced by sorting pj can change as a result of changes in uncertainty. There is
also a phase-transition from jagged and oscillatory price curves, to smooth and stable price curves.
The behavior of the smooth regions under this 1-norm uncertainty is qualitatively different from the
2-norm case, in that prices do not seem to converge to a common value even as  approaches a large
value of 0.5. We note that when replicating these plots for extremely large values of  (e.g.  = 2 to
 = 3) it is possible to make prices converge to a common value, however such levels of uncertainty
are entirely unreasonable in practice.
The last component of our experiments concerns how different pricing schemes would affect revenue
for agents which seek to maximize their robust utility. The plot below qualitatively matches what
we saw in the 2-norm case: using nominal prices for buyers with robust utility functions produces
much less revenue than if robust prices were used. Reasonable perturbations of 10% relative error in
the valuations can result in revenue dropping by over 20%.
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Appendix B: deferred proofs
This appendix provides the omitted proofs for claims made throughout the article. In particular, we
provide proofs of Propositions 3, 5, and 6. We also provide a direct proof of Proposition 1, which
was previously established indirectly through appeal to Eisenberg (1961).
Proposition 3. Let ui(z) = min{z · v | v ∈ Vi}. Then the optimal objective value of (4) is no
larger than the optimal objective value of (5).
Proof. Let Opt denote the optimal objective value of (4). We will construct (5) by considering (4)
as minimizing the negative objective
∑n
i=1 Q ri − bi log(ti). We will undo this negation as the final
step of the proof.
Begin by introducing dual variables β ∈ Rn+ for the utility hypograph constraints, and p ∈ Rm+ for
the item supply constraints. We also introduce variables vi ∈ Vi to simplify our Lagrangian:
L(X, t, r,β,p,V ) =∑ni=1{Q ri − bi log(ti)}
+
∑n
i=1{βi(ti − vi · xi −Q ri)}
+
∑n
i=1{xi · p} − 1 · p.
This Lagrangian is useful to us, because we have the following minimax characterization of Opt:
−Opt = min
X≥0
r≥0
t∈Rn
max
p≥0
β≥0
vi∈Vi
L(X, t, r,β,p,V ) (6)
≥ max
p≥0
β≥0
vi∈Vi
min
X≥0
r≥0
t∈Rn
L(X, t, r,β,p,V )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:F (β,p,V )
. (7)
In view of the minimax relationship (6)-(7), the claim of weak duality for the pair (4)-(5) reduces to
simplifying the dual function F (β,p,V ) to a form which matches (5).
Next we group terms by primal variables. Define
• A(X,β,p,V ) = ∑ni=1 xi · p− βivi · xi,
• B(t,β) = ∑ni=1 βiti − bi log(ti), and
• C(r,β) = ∑ni=1 ri − βiri
so that the dual function F (β,p,V ) is given by
min
X≥0
r≥0
t∈Rn
A(X,β,p,V ) +B(t,β) + QC(r,β)− 1 · p.
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The minimization overX , r, and t can be performed independently from one another, and yields
min
X≥0
A(X,β,p,V ) =
{
0 if p− βivi ≥ 0 ∀i
−∞ otherwise , (8)
min
t∈Rn
B(t,β) =
n∑
i=1
bi + bi log(βi/bi), (9)
and
min
r≥0
C(r,β) =
{
0 if 1− β ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise . (10)
We have thus shown that
Opt ≤ min
p≥0
β≥0
vi∈Vi
−F (β,p,V ),
and by simplifying the dual function with (8)-(10), this is equivalent to Opt being a lower bound on
the objective of problem (5).
It is also possible to prove a strong duality result between (4)-(5). From a technical perspective,
strong duality would require that ∅ 6= Vi ⊂ Rm+ are compact convex sets, and ui(1) > 0. Indeed,
these are the assumptions stated in Section 2. A proof of strong duality would proceed by using the
facts that z 7→ −ui(−z) is the support function of the convex set Vi, and that the Fenchel conjugate
of a convex set’s support function is the set’s indicator function.
As a mechanical detail, it would be important that to introduce dual variables to constraints xij ≥ 0
when using the Fenchel duality approach. Dual variables for such constraints play an important role
in our supplemental proof of Proposition 1, given below.5
Proposition 1. A solution to (4) with Q = 0 produces an equilibrium for Fisher markets under
robust utilities
ui(z) = min{z · v | v ∈ Vi}.
The solution produces optimal prices p∗ and allocationsX∗ with the following properties:
1. Optimal allocations x∗i are in the robust demand set of buyer i for every i, i.e.
x∗i ∈ argmax
{
min
v∈Vi
v · z | p∗ · z ≤ bi, z ≥ 0
}
.
2. Every item j with a positive price p∗j > 0 clears the market, i.e
∑
i x
∗
ij = 1.
3. For every buyer i, there exists a v∗i ∈ argminv∈Vi v ·xi for which allocated items have the
same bang per buck:
if x∗ij , x
∗
ik > 0 then
v∗ij
p∗j
=
v∗ik
p∗k
.
Supplemental proof. Assume strong duality between the primal-dual pair (4)-(5).
• The complementary slackness condition
p∗j ·
(∑
i
x∗ij − 1
)
= 0
implies the market clearing condition.
5We call this proof supplemental, because the results of Eisenberg (1961) and Chen et al. (2007) suffice for
indirect proofs.
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• Let p∗, β∗, and {v∗i }ni=1 be an optimal dual solution, and let x∗i be an optimal primal
solution for the primal-dual pair (4)-(5). By considering Equation 8 in our proof of Propo-
sition 3, there is a complementary-slackness relationship between primal bound constraints
0 ≤ xij and dual bilinear constraints pj − βivij ≥ 0. Thus whenever x∗ij > 0, we have
p∗j −β∗i v∗ij = 0, and hence the ratio v∗ij/p∗j = β∗i is the same for all items j where x∗ij > 0.
Next we must show that v∗i belongs to argminv∈Vi v · xi. This follows by considering the
dual Lagrangian
(p∗,β∗,V ,X∗) 7→ p∗ · 1−∑ni=1{bi + bi log(β∗i /bi)}
−∑ni=1{x∗i · (p∗ − β∗i vi)}
which (per first order necessary conditions) must be minimized over vi ∈ Vi. Since β∗i > 0,
the minimizers v∗i will always belong to argminv∈Vi v ·x∗i . This implies the third assertion.
• For the first assertion, we note that the first order KKT condition implied by the vanishing
of the dual Lagrangian derivative with respect to βi implies that p∗ ·x∗i = bi. Now consider
the dual optimization problem faced by buyer i:
min λibi
s.t. vi ≤ λip∗
vi ∈ Vi
We note that λi = β∗i
−1,v∗i are feasible with respect to this dual problem, and thus the
quantity biβ∗i constitutes an upper bound to the utility attainable by buyer i. But this utility
is attained at the allocation x∗i since
min
vi∈Vi
vi · x∗i = v∗i · x∗i =
∑
j
pj
β∗i
x∗ij =
bi
βi∗ .
Hence x∗i is in the demand set of buyer i.
The story for the quasi-Fisher case (Proposition 2) is similar. One is free to rely on prior work
by Chen et al. to be certain that the primal allocations and dual variables to supply constraints
comprise an equilibrium for ui of the form we consider. Just as well, one can prove the proposition by
considering optimality conditions of the primal-dual pair (4)-(5). Since the Fisher market illustrated
the latter approach, we do not dwell on this for the quasi-Fisher case. Instead, we turn to proving the
second robust-regret bound from Section 3.3.
Proposition 5. Suppose |vij − v′ij | ≤ R for all vi,v′i ∈ Vi, i = 1, . . . , n. Then the following holds:
1
n
n∑
i=1
Robust-Regreti ≤
2Rm
n
.
Proof. Suppose xi,x′i are two feasible allocations, and vi,v
′
i for i = 1, . . . , n are utility parameters
in the uncertainty set Vi such that
vi · xi ≥ vi · x′i.
Setting ∆vi = vi − v′i it follows that
v′i · xi = vi · xi −∆vi · xi
≥ vi · x′i −∆vi · xi
= v′i · x′i + ∆vi · (x′i − xi) .
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Hence,
1
n
n∑
i=1
(v′i · xi − v′i · x′i) ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
∆vi · (x′i − xi)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∆vij
(
x′ij − xij
)
≥ − 2
n
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
|∆vij |xij
≥ − 2
n
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Rxij
= −2Rm/n.
Setting vi to be the realization with respect to which the equilibrium allocation xi for i = 1, . . . , n
is calculated, and v′i, x
′
i to be the allocation at which the worst-case robust-regret is realized, we
obtain the required bound on robust regret.
Finally, we turn to proving Proposition 6. The proof will largely reduce to the following simple
lemma.
Lemma 2. Set S = {θΦᵀ : ‖θ‖2 ≤ 1, ‖Φ‖F ≤ 2} and T = {v : ‖v‖2 ≤ 12}. We claim that
S = T .
Proof. Note that the origin is contained in both sets. Consider a point x 6= 0, and suppose x ∈ T .
By choosing θ = 1[1, 0, . . . , 0], and Φᵀ to be the matrix where the first row is 2xᵀ/‖x‖2 and all
remaining rows zero, we see that x = θΦᵀ, and hence x ∈ S.
Suppose x .= θΦᵀ ∈ S. Viewing Φᵀ as a linear operator acting on θ and noting the relationship
between the operator and Frobenius norms ‖Φᵀ‖ ≤ ‖Φᵀ‖F , we have that
‖x‖2 ≤ ‖θ‖2‖Φᵀ‖
≤ ‖θ‖2‖Φᵀ‖F
≤ 12,
and so x ∈ T .
Proposition 6. Let Vouti (1, 2) denote the set
{v :v = µ+ δΦ̂ᵀ + θˆi∆ᵀ + θˆiΦ̂ᵀ,
v ≥ 0, v · 1 = vˆi · 1, ‖δ‖2 ≤ 1‖θˆi‖2,
‖µ‖2 ≤ 12‖θˆi‖2‖Φ̂‖F , ‖∆‖F ≤ 2‖Φ̂‖F }.
Then
conv
(VJi (1, 2)) ⊆ Vouti (1, 2).
Proof. Note that every element in VJi (1, 2) may be expressed as
(
θˆi + δ
)(
Φ̂ᵀ + ∆ᵀ
)
, for
‖δ‖2 ≤ 1‖θˆi‖2, and ‖∆‖F ≤ 2‖Φ̂‖F . Using Lemma 2, the result follows immediately.
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